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THE ROLE OF COMITY IN THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS
MICHAEL WELLSt

Considerationsof comity often requirefederal courts to defer to
state courts when federal issues could be raisedin stateproceedings.
Contexts in which such deference is requiredinclude Younger abstention, habeus corpus exhaustion andproceduraldefault, and Pullman
and Burford abstention In this Article, Professor Wells demonstrates
that the Supreme Court's opinionsfail to make a distinction between
cases where comity requiresrestraintand those where it does not. The
Court's motive in invoking comity is not to decrease access to federal
courts,but instead to strike a compromise between the individual's interest in afederalforum and the state's interestin a stateforum. Professor Wells concludes that the Court uses comity as a vague
abstraction to shield its arbitraryassignment of some cases to federal
courtsandsome to state courts because it is unable or unwilling tofind
that one of these interests is generaly the stronger.
Twenty years ago in Monroe v. PapeI the Supreme Court opened the federal courts to virtually any individual with a constitutional claim against a
state officer. In the past decade, however, the Court has increasingly cut back
on access to a federal forum for litigation of such claims. In a line of cases
beginning with Younger v. Harris,it has held that considerations of comity,
which it defines as "a proper respect for state functions," often require federal
courts to defer to state courts when federal issues could be raised in state proceedings.2 Even before the development of Younger abstention, the Court invoked comity in requiring deference to state courts in other contexts:
discretionary dismissal of pendent state claims, habeas corpus exhaustion and
procedural default, and Pullman and Buiford abstention.
The Court asserts that it has identified good reasons for deferring to state
courts in these cases while continuing to permit access to federal courts in
t
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1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

2. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), quoted in City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443
U.S. 905, 908 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari). Other cases so holding
include Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601
(1975); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 519 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some of these
cases quote more elaborately from Younger, defining comity as

a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that

the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44, quoted in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 334; Huffman v. Pursue
Ltd., 420 U.S. at 601.
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other constitutional cases. 3 Critics of the deferential decisions take a quite
different view of comity. They charge that the Court's reasoning in the recent
comity cases within the Younger doctrine undermines virtually all federal jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the actions of state officers, and
they warn that the recent cases lay the foundation for a general shrinking of
access to federal courts for such suits. 4 Some of the Court's harshest critics
contend that the Court uses comity not only to diminish access to federal
courts, but also to restrict substantive constitutional rights.
This Article will argue that both the Court and its critics are wrong. For
the most part, the case law will not support the Court's claim that the opinions
have made viable distinctions between cases where comity requires restraint
and those where it does not. At the same time, the critics take the Court's
comity talk too seriously. The Court does not intend to apply the reasoning of
the comity cases to bring about a steady decrease in access to federal courts.
The role of comity in these cases is not to identify good reasons for federal
court restraint in particular areas nor to undermine access to federal court in
general. Rather, the Court makes arbitrary distinctions between cases, assigning some to federal courts and others to state courts. It uses comity as a
device to obscure the lack of good reasons for those distinctions.
Why does the Court make arbitrary distinctions? The question of
whether a case should be assigned to a federal or a state court presents a conflict between the state's interest in having the issues adjudicated in a state forum and the individual's interest in a federal forum. The Court has been
unwilling to hold as a general proposition that either of these is the stronger
and, consequently, has not articulated a broad rule allocating these cases to
either the state or federal court system. It has only partially succeeded in identifying one interest or the other as the stronger at a lower level of generality, in
particular kinds of cases. The court has accommodated the competing interests by arbitrarily dividing decision-making responsibility between federal and
state courts. It attempts to hide the absence of good reasons for its allocation
of the cases by explaining that comity requires deference in some cases but not
others and by varying the content of comity as it moves from one case to
another. In short, the Court, desiring to accommodate both interests, makes
arbitrary distinctions because it cannot find good ones. It employs comity as a
vague abstraction in order to avoid having to choose between these interests as
a general guide to decision making.
Part I of the Article describes the areas where the Court employs comity
and briefly sketches the historical and policy contexts in which those doctrines
3. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-35 (1979); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
460-63 (1974); Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 605 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435-43 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 550-51 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 616-18 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103 (1977);
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1191 (1977). See also Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction,
22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 683, 701-20 (1981).
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have evolved. Part II draws a distinction between two kinds of comity cases
based on whether the issues are state or federal. In state law cases the Court
has substantially resolved the conflict between state and individual interests in
favor of the state. Here the Court has successfully generated a principle of
comity that unsettled state law issues should be decided in state courts. It has
devised no such principle for most of the federal law cases. Part III examines
the body of rules the Court has enunciated in the name of comity for allocating federal cases between state and federal courts. It demonstrates that neither
the Court's nor its critics' explanations for these rules are persuasive and offers
the alternative explanation that many of the Court's rules are pragmatic compromises. Part IV briefly examines the federal courts' occasional use of comity
to diminish substantive constitutional protections and concludes that the scattered cases of this sort are deviations from the norm and not harbingers of a
trend.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMTY-BASED RESTRAINTS
ON FEDERAL COURTS

5
The notion of comity surfaced infrequently in the law of federal courts
6
before the 1960s. Comity is invoked as a basis for restraining federal court
interference in matters of importance to the state, and the sixties saw a dramatic increase in the occasions for interference. Much of the increase can be
traced to two cases decided early in the decade, Monroe v. Pape7 and Fay v.
Noia.s In Monroe the Supreme Court construed the Civil Rights Act of 1871,

5. Comity is a sufficiently imprecise word to permit its use in a variety of contexts that have
in common little more than the perceived need for such an abstraction to aid in the resolution or
avoidance of conflicts between governmental bodies. For a discussion of its origins, see generally
Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 9 (1966). Comity is used in deciding choice of
law issues, whether the choice is between the law of two states, see, e.g., Henry v. RichardsonMerrill, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 1975), or between federal and state law, see, e.g., Witherow
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1976). The term is also used to minimize friction and resolve disputes in the relations: (1) between nations, see, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v.
India, 434 U.S. 308, 319 (1978); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
765 (1972); (2) between states, compare Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-34 (1978) (privileges
and immunities clause establishes a norm of comity which states must respect) with Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (whether one state recognizes another state's claim of sovereign immunity is a matter of comity between them and is not controlled by the Constitution); (3) between
branches of the federal government, see, e.g., Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 588 F.2d 638,
641 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
963 (1975); (4) between courts and agencies, see, e.g., Sunflower Elec. Co-op. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 603 F.2d 791, 795 (10th Cir. 1979); Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Quantas Airways, Ltd.,
525 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); (5) between federal and state
agencies, see, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co. v. EPA, 603 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1979); General Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Equal Employ. Opp. Comm'n, 491 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1974); (6) between civil
and military courts, see, e.g., Sc esinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975); (7) between
courts of the same sovereign, see, e.g., Gregory-Portland Indep. School Dist. v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 576 F.2d 81, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); and (8) between
judges of the same court, see, e.g., Bowles v. Wilke, 175 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 861 (1949).
6. It was not unknown, however. See generally Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the AntiInjunction Statute, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 330, 338-44 (1978).
7. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
8. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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now codified at 42 U.S.C. section 1983, to provide a broad federal remedy for
violations of constitutional rights by state officers. At issue was the effect of
language in the statute providing a federal remedy when unconstitutional action was taken "under color of state law." Should there be a federal remedy
when the officer's actions violated state law and could be remedied in state
court? Over Justice Frankfurter's dissenting view that values of federalism
require state adjudication in such circumstances, 9 the majority ruled that an
officer acts under color of state law whenever he is "clothed with the authority
of state law."' 1
In Fay the Court addressed the scope of the habeas corpus statute, which
provides a federal remedy to state prisoners held in violation of their constitutional rights. The Court reaffirmed and elaborated upon an earlier decision
that habeas extends to virtually all constitutional violations that take place in
state criminal proceedings, Iland held that those claims could often be brought
in federal court even where they had not properly been raised in state court. 12
Justice Harlan's dissent protested that the decision would destroy the effectiveness of state criminal processes and gravely harm the values of federalism. 13
Added to these expanded federal remedies was a proliferation of newly
articulated constitutional rights in the areas of first amendment freedoms,
criminal procedure, procedural and substantive due process, and equal protection. The combination of new rights and readily available remedies led to
dramatic increases in the habeas and civil rights work of the federal courts 14
and to a corresponding pressure on the balance of decisionmaking between
federal and state courts. Suits that once would have been brought under state
common or statutory law in the state courts were now recast in constitutional
terms and taken to federal court.' 5
The Supreme Court responded to this threat to state prerogatives by invoking comity as a justification for restraints on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. In Fay itself the Court conceded that comity would sometimes
require federal court restraint in spite of the broad reach of the habeas statute.16 Thus, when a prisoner fails to exhaust his state remedies before petitioning the federal court, comity will ordinarily bar federal relief until state
courts have reviewed the claim, 17 and in some cases when the prisoner fails
9. See 365 U.S. at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
10. See 365 U.S. at 184-85 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 229, 326 (1941)).
11. See 372 U.S. at 399-415, afrg Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
12. See 372 U.S. at 426-35.
13. See 372 U.S. at 448-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 950 & n.3, 1503-04 & nn.l-5 (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Hart &
Wechsler]; H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 75 & n.4 (1973); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 142-44 (1970).
15. See Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d, 874, 880 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd per curiam, 439 U.S. 438
(1979); Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 1975).

16. See 372 U.S. at 419-20.
17. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,275-78 (1971). The exhaustion requirement is statutory with respect to post-conviction remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254b, but it is nevertheless appropriate
to consider it as a judge-made requirement of comity. The statute is a codification of the Court's
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properly to raise a claim in state court, comity bars federal relief altogether. 18
In cases where a state program is challenged on constitutional grounds
under section 1983 or otherwise, the Court has invoked comity as a basis for
three doctrines. One is the Pullman abstention doctrine,'19'which dates from
the forties and was given up for dead in the mid-sixties20 before its revival in
the seventies. 2 1 The doctrine holds that when a federal court is asked to enjoin
state officers on constitutional grounds and the constitutional issue might be
averted by construction of unsettled state law, the court may stay the case and
send the parties to the state court for resolution of the state law issue. For
example, a chiropractor may bring a fourteenth amendment challenge against
a state law prohibiting the unauthorized practice of medicine.22 Construction
of the state law may reveal that the plaintiff's activities are not prohibited by
the statute and, therefore, the constitutional issue need not be decided. The
Court justifies Pullman abstention in part by reference to the policy against
unnecessary decisions of24constitutional issues3 and in part as a matter of comity towards state courts.
A second comity-based doctrine is Burford abstention, also dating from
the forties. 25 There is some confusion about the scope of Buf/ord abstention.
It appears to hold either that a federal court should dismiss constitutional
challenges to state administrative action concerning matters primarily of local
comity-based exhaustion requirement. See Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1094 & n.3 (1970). Preconviction exhaustion is not covered by the
statute but rests on the Court's decision in Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). See, e.g., Neville
v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1834 (1980); United States
ex rel Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 884-908 (1965). Federal
courts do not treat post-conviction exhaustion as a rigid requirement but continue to consider it as
a rule of comity that they may ignore when there are good reasons for doing so. See, e.g.,
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (per curiam); Codispoti v. Howard, 589 F.2d
135, 140 (3d Cir. 1978).
18. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83-87 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536,
541-42 (1976).
19. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally Field, Abstention
in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071
(1974).
20. See Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist
Era, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 604, 604 (1967).
21. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406
U.S. 498 (1972); Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
22. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
23. See Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972); Field, supra note 19,
at 1096-1101.
24. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176-77 (1961); Field, supra note 19, at 1093-96.
Originally the Court justified abstention in these cases by noting that the plaintiff sought an injunction and stressing the broad discretion of a court of equity in devising a just remedy. See
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941). As the doctrine has developed
over the years, the Court has abstained in cases in which no injunction was sought. See, e.g.,
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,28 (1959); Field, supra note 19, at
1139-40 & nn. 177-81.
25. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See also Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). See generally Comment, Abstention by Federal Courts in
Suits Challenging State Administrative Decisions: The Scope of the Burford Doctrine, 46 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 971 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Scope of Buford Doctrine].
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concern, or that it should dismiss cases when its decision might unnecessarily
disrupt state policies, or perhaps both. Unlike Pullman, the Burford doctrine
is grounded in comity alone and operates whether or not a constitutional issue
26
in the case may be avoided by decision of an unsettled issue of state law.
Also unlike the 7Pullman doctrine, it requires dismissal instead of a stay of the
2
federal action.
The third doctrine, and the source of the recent controversial decisions,
grows out of Dombrowski v. 1Pfster 28 and Younger v. Harris.2 9 It concerns
requests for federal injunctions against state court proceedings. In the paradigm case the state has brought or threatened to bring a criminal prosecution
against, for example, a movie theater operator for violation of an obscenity
statute. The state criminal defendant then becomes a plaintiff in a federal civil
rights action seeking to enjoin the prosecution on the ground that the statute
violates the first amendment. The Supreme Court has held that comity is
often a bar to the federal civil rights suit.
Finally, the Court employs comity to protect state prerogatives in pendent
jurisdiction cases, in which the plaintiff brings a federal action and appends to
it a related state law claim. Thus, in UnitedMine Workers v. Gibbs,30 plaintiff
claimed that a secondary boycott violated his rights under federal labor law
and also amounted to interference with contractual relations under state tort
law. The Gibbs court held that a federal court has jurisdiction over a pendent
claim whenever the federal and state claims derive from the same factual
background. In addition, however, the Court warned that district courts
should exercise their discretion to dismiss pendent state law claims when the
gain in convenience from hearing all of plaintiffs arguments at once is out'31
weighed by considerations of "comity and. . . justice between the parties.
II.

COMITY AND STATE LAW ISSUES

At the outset of this Article, it was asserted that the Court often uses comity in a talismanic fashion to dispose of cases without giving good reasons. But
it will be useful to begin this study by examining an area where the Court has
devised a well-rationalized general principle of comity, the principle that un26. See Scope of Bur/ord Doctrine, supra note 25, at 974.
27. See, e.g., BT Inv. Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 559 F.2d 950, 953-55 (5th Cir. 1977); Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 1107,
1122 (1974).
28. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and

Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1274-1330 (1977). As with Pullman abstention, see note 24
supra, the Court initially justified abstention in these circumstances by reference to the old equitable rule that a court of equity should not enjoin a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Douglas v. City
of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943). See generally Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine:
Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1155-63 (1977). More recently the Court

has emphasized that the "more vital consideration" supporting abstention is federal-state comity.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44. See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441, 444
(1977); Soifer & Macgill supra, at 1169-83; 0. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 61-68 (1978).
30. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
31. Id. at 726.
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settled state law issues should be decided in state court. Here the Court has
balanced the competing state and individual interests, chosen the state interest
as generally the stronger, and articulated a principle that implements that
choice. This principle justifies the Court's deference to state courts in Pullman
abstention cases and in discretionary dismissal of pendent state claims. A
brief review of the Court's work will provide an instructive contrast to the
federal law cases considered in Part III, where the Court has not made such a
choice.
A. The Principlethat State Law Should Be Made in State Courts
When the substantive issues are governed by state law, the state's interest
in a state forum is very strong, and the individual's interest in a federal forum
is comparatively weak. The state's interest is based on the institutional advantages of state adjudication. State courts are more familiar with state law and
are more sensitive to the policies underlying state law than are their federal
counterparts. When a federal court decides a state law issue, its holding has
no force beyond the parties at hand. It is at best a forecast of what the state
court would do, at worst an error that wrongly decides the case. 32 In contrast,
the individual's interest is generally no more than convenience and economy
in litigation. In most cases he is in federal court by virtue of a federal claim,
but there is a state issue lurking in the case that can conveniently be litigated
at the same time.3 3 In diversity cases, the individual litigant may assert a different and perhaps stronger claim to a federal forum because the parties are
citizens of different states and the only substantive issues are state law questions. In this area the individual is supported by a policy, specifically identified in the Constitution and enforced by a jurisdictional statute, of protecting
out-of-staters against the possibility of local prejudice.34 When this last consideration is not present, the Court has chosen the state interest as the stronger
and has enunciated the principle that unsettled state issues should be decided
in state courts.
This principle provides part of the underpinning for the Pullman absten35
tion doctrine and for the restrictive aspects of pendent jurisdiction as well.
In Pullman abstention the Court's justification for delaying adjudication of the
constitutional decision until the state issue is decided is its policy of avoiding
unnecessary constitutional decisions. But the justification for sending the parties to state court is the principle that unsettled state law issues should be decided by state courts.3 6 Likewise, in pendent jurisdiction one of the primary
32. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 428-30 (1979).

33. This is true both of Pullman abstention situations, in which the individual brings a constitutional challenge to a state law that might be avoided by the resolution of a state law issue, and of
pendent jurisdiction situations, in which federal jurisdiction is based on a federal claim and the

court will only take jurisdiction over a state claim that is closely related to that federal claim.
34. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 14, at 1051-53.
35. See United Mineworkers Union v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
36. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964).
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the state
justifications for discretionary dismissal of pendent state claims is that
37
issues are unsettled and therefore should be heard in state court.
In recent years the Court has relied increasingly on this principle to extend abstention beyond the standard Pullman pattern. The Court has upheld
abstention in cases in which there were unsettled state law issues but no difficult federal constitutional issues3 8 or in which no request for injunctive relief
was made. 39 In an ordinary diversity case, devoid of any federal issues, it
approved certification of unsettled state law issues to the state court. 40 Many
lower federal courts have abstained
in purely state law cases without disap41
proval from the Supreme Court.
How strong is this principle? Federal courts do sometimes decide state
law claims in spite of it. They have developed three limiting glosses upon it.
First, the principle is strong only when state law is uncertain. 42 It may be
ignored for mere convenience in deciding all aspects of a case at one time if
the case concerns routine application of settled law. 43 Only where state law is
uncertain is there much danger that the federal court will go wrong. Second,
efficiency considerations sometimes prevail of their own weight, as when the
federal court has invested much effort in the case before a question arises as to
the propriety of pendent jurisdiction. 4 Third, application of the principle requires that a state court be available to hear the claim. When it is not, as when
the state statute of limitations has run, the federal court will hear state
claims.4 5
Apart from these limits, the contours and strength of this "state law in
state courts" principle are somewhat uncertain. The Supreme Court has never
wholeheartedly endorsed abstention in diversity cases, perhaps because of the
explicit constitutional and legislative authorization of diversity jurisdiction, or
37. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973). Other factors entering into the dismissal decision are the
possibility ofjury confusion, inconvenience, and the nature of the federal issue. See 383 US. at
726-27.
Discretionary dismissal of pendent claims is less often permissible when they are governed by
federal rather than state law-for example, when a federal claim does not meet a jurisdictional
amount requirement. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 548 (1974).
38. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (plurality
opinion).
39. See Field, supra note 19, at 1140.
40. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1974) (ordering court of appeals to
consider certifying unsettled state issue to Florida court in diversity case).
41. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 14, at 998-1005.
42. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 55 (1973) (abstention); Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973) (pendent jurisdiction); Pride v. Community School Bd., 482
F.2d 257, 272 (2d Cir. 1973) (pendent jurisdiction). See also City of Gainesville v. Florida Power
& Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1283-84 (S.D. Fla. 1980). But see Johns-Manville Corp. v.
Doyall, 510 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion) (federal court should abstain even
when state law is clear).
43. E.g., Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958). See Hart & Wechsler, supra
note 14, at 991-92.
44. See Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1979); Parrent
v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 129 (7th Cir. 1972).
45. See O'Brien v. Continental I. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 64 (7th Cir. 1979).
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because it considers the individual interest in avoiding local prejudice stronger
than the Pullman and pendent jurisdiction interest in litigation convenience.
The Court is as yet unwilling to hold that the state interest is stronger in this
context. In addition, the Court has left unclear whether the "state law in state
courts" principle is grounded wholly on the advantages of state adjudication
of unsettled state issues or whether federal court deference may also be based
on a characterization of a dispute as peculiarly local in nature.46 Some of the
opinions suggest that disputes concerning eminent domain,4 7 natural resources, 48 and domestic relations49 fall into this category, so that deference
may be warranted even when the state issues are routine and not unsettled.
Again, however, the Court has not unambiguously endorsed this extension of
the principle.50
B. DistinguishingBetween State and FederalIssues
These questions about the scope and premises of deference to state courts
on matters of state law require further attention from the Court, but they can
be put aside for purposes of the present inquiry. The central point is that the
Court has articulated a principle of comity that state law be made in state
courts in the absence of significant countervailing considerations. In this context the Court has weighed the individual interest in a federal forum against
the state interest in a state forum and deemed the latter the stronger.
In contrast to the fairly orderly body of law generated by the "state law in
state courts" principle, the Court has not articulated any principle that federal
constitutional issues should generally be heard in either federal or state courts.
The Court sometimes invokes comity as the justification for requiring that
they be decided finally in state courts. 5 1 . Sometimes it says that comity requires federal courts to delay their consideration of federal issues until state
courts have heard them.5 2 On other occasions it entirely rejects state arguments for federal court deference.5 3 The complexity of the Court's approach
to these issues shows that the Court finds the choice between state and individual interests more difficult when federal constitutional issues are involved.
There are important differences between the state and federal law contexts that make the choice between the state and individual interests a hard
46. See, e.g., Dome Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Goldenberg, 442 F. Supp. 438, 441-46 (S.D.

Fla. 1977).
47. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,28-29 (1959) (plural-

ity opinion).
48. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974).

50. For example, some of the language in the Thibodaux plurality opinion supports this explanation of the case. See 360 U.S. at 28-29. But a concurring opinion explains the case as an
application of the unsettled state law principle. See id. at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring). And in

KaiserSteel the Court's brief opinion mentions both the presence of unsettled state issues and the
peculiarly local nature of the dispute. See 391 U.S. at 594. See also Field, supra note 19, at 1148-

53.
51. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 347-49 (1951).
52. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973).
53. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
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one in the latter area. With respect to federal issues, the strong institutional
interest in state court adjudication of state issues is not present. State courts
are not sovereign over these issues. Lower federal courts are more familiar
with the operation of federal law and can be expected to approach it with a
more national perspective, and consequently, will be more likely to develop a
uniformity in its construction and application.5 4 Thus, the structure of the
federal system suggests that the federal courts are the proper arbiters of federal
issues and that the broad argument for federal court deference must look elsewhere for support. That argument rests on the premise that even though these
cases are governed by federal law, the state has an interest in state court adjudication of claims concerning federal constitutional challenges to its activities.
Only in this way, it is argued, can states oversee the day-to-day administration
and construe state statutes in accordance with constitutional
of state law
55
standards.
The individual, by contrast, has a much stronger case for federal adjudication here than in the state law context. Not only does the institutional argument on the proper roles of federal and state courts favor him, but he can also
rely on the independence of federal judges guaranteed in Article III of the
Constitution. This independence is especially important in deciding constitutional claims, as the function of the court is to protect the individual's rights
against majoritarian goals. Moreover, it is particularly important that federal
rather than state judges decide federal law challenges to state official action, as
for their reelection
state judges may overly value state interests and may fear
56
or reappointment if they invalidate popular state laws.
III.

COMrY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE ACTION

The Court has shown substantially more respect in federal law cases for
these arguments on behalf of the individual's preference for a federal forum
than it has in state law cases. Even so, it has not ignored the state's arguments
to the contrary. Instead of pronouncing a broad rule allocating constitutional
challenges to one court system or the other, the Court has attempted to accommodate both the state and individual interests by allocating some cases to state
courts and some to the federal courts. The Court maintains that in the areas
where it requires deference, considerations of comity are especially strong.
This part of the Article will examine four doctrinal areas where the Court,
54. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 548 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
463-64 (1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-43 (1972); England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medi-

cal Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964). See also Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A
Reply, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1352 (1970); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts,

53

Colum. L. Rev. 157, 170-76 (1953); Neuborne, supra note 4, at 1105.
55. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,441-43 (1977) (applying Younger doctrine);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,609 (1975) (applying Younger doctrine); Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270, 275-78 (1971) (writ of habeas corpus); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50-53 (1971).
Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S 475, 491-92 (1973) (writ of habeas corpus, state administrative
body). See also George v. Parratt, 602 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1979); Insurance Fed'n v. Supreme
Court, 489 F. Supp. 89, 91-93 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
56. See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 1127-28.
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relying on comity, requires individuals to raise federal constitutional issues in
state court rather than federal court. The four areas are Younger abstention,
Buiford abstention, habeas corpus exhaustion, and habeas corpus procedural
default. In cases falling within the first three of these areas, the Court has not
provided convincing reasons why they should be treated differently than other
constitutional challenges. Only in the procedural default area has the Court
successfully articulated a principle of comity and consistently applied it to the
relevant range of cases.
A.

The Younger Doctrine and the Pending/Non-PendingDistinction

In 1961 Monroe v. Pape57 broadly construed the civil rights act to grant
access to federal court to virtually any individual with a constitutional claim
against a state officer, even where an adequate remedy is available in the state
courts. The plaintiffs in Monroe were permitted to bring a federal suit against
police officers for an unconstitutional search of their home even though the
search also violated state law and could have been remedied in a state tort suit.
Beginning in 1970 with Younger v. Harris,5 8 however, the Court has substantially limited the impact of Monroe. In a series of cases it has held that comity
requires deference when the constitutional claims could be raised in a pending
state proceeding. In Younger the federal plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a California statute proscribing subversive activities. At the time of
the federal suit, he was a defendant in a state criminal prosecution brought
under that statute, and in his federal suit he sought to enjoin the prosecution.
The Court held that comity required the federal court to show respect for the
pending state proceeding by dismissing the federal suit.5 9 In subsequent cases
the Court has extended the dismissal requirement to include pending state
court civil proceedings, at least when they are instituted by the state, 60 and
state appellate review as well as trials. 6 1 In addition, it has held that an issue
decided in the state proceeding cannot be relitigated in a later federal section
1983 suit, 62 so that the effect of the original dismissal often is to assign the case
to the state courts for final resolution.
Why should attacks on pending state proceedings be treated differently
than other constitutional challenges? The Court addressed this question in
Steffel v. Thompson.63 Steffel had distributed anti-war handbills at a private
shopping center, in violation of a state criminal trespass statute. He was
57. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 14, at 947-51. See generally
Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 277
(1965).

58. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
59. Id. at 43-54.
60. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434
(1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (state not a party but had a substantial interest in the
outcome).
61. See, e.g., Huffnan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See Soifer & Macgill, supra note
27, at 1183.
62. Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980).
63. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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threatened with prosecution if he continued his conduct, and a companion
who did not heed the warning was prosecuted. Steffel sought a federal declaratory judgment that the statute violated his first amendment rights.
The Court permitted the suit. It explained that the comity considerations
underlying Younger were not present here. According to the Seffel Court,
comity was important in Younger because it is insulting to the state court for a
federal court to take away issues that bear directly on a case before the state
court, because federal intervention would disrupt the ongoing state judicial
process, and because the individual interest in a federal forum is weak when a
pending state proceeding is available to hear the federal issues. 64 None of
these factors is present where there is no pending state proceeding.
The rationale for the Younger doctrine offered by the Court in Steffel is a
state interest narrower and stronger than the general interest in state court
adjudication of federal challenges to state activity. This narrower interest is
strong enough to prevail against the individual's interest in a federal forum
even though the general state interest might not be sufficient to support federal
court deference in the broad run of cases. Accordingly, when the Court invokes comity as the basis for its deferential rulings in Younger cases, the Court
seems to have in mind a principle that "a proper respect for state functions"
requires federal deference to pending state proceedings. Taken on its own
terms, this may be a viable basis for distinguishing between the two groups of
federal plaintiffs represented by Younger and Monroe. While a critic might
value the state and individual interests differently than the Court, it would be
hard to show that it is illegitimate to value the state interest in the integrity of
65
pending proceedings as strongly as does the Court.
But the Court in later cases has not applied the Younger doctrine in the
64. The Court said:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed,
federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the

state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional
principles. In addition, while a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff
with a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the part of
the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of
forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.
Id. at 462. See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975); Lake Carriers Ass'n v.
MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1972).
65. It might be argued, however, that the Court is unconvincing in its attempt to show that
the state interest in pending proceedings is especially important. The Court's contention that the
federal plaintiff will have no opportunity to raise his federal claims where there is no pending state
proceeding ignores the potential availability of state declaratory, injunctive and tort remedies. See
Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference With State Court Proceedings: The
Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 591, 678-79 (1975). Disruption and insult attendant upon interference with pending proceedings will be of concern in the
rare case in which the federal marshall walks into the crowded state courtroom and serves the
parties or the judge with a federal injunction. In the majority of cases, however, federal relief will
consist of removal of a state case from a list of unheard cases kept in the clerk's office. There will
be no more disruption than if the state case had been settled, and state judges may scarcely be
aware of the insult visited upon them.
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limited way suggested by Steffel. Although the Court has not forthrightly
abandoned the Steffel argument or articulated some other principle to replace
66
or supplement it, the Court in Hicks v. Miranda, Huffman v. Pursue,Ltd ,67
6
8
and Moore v. Sims has ordered deference in circumstances where Steffel
would permit federal adjudication.
In Hicks the Court held that the federal court must dismiss on Younger
grounds, even when the federal suit is filed before the state proceeding, if the
state case is brought before there have been substantial proceedings on the
merits in the federal court.69 The opinion in Hicks neither distinguishes nor
overrules Steffel, but Hicks seems at odds with the Steffel rationale for federal
deference. Hicks suggests that it is not so much the narrow state interest in the
integrity of state proceedings that underlies the Younger doctrine as it is the
more general interest in state court adjudication of constitutional challenges to
state law.
The Court in Hicks said that strict adherence to a pending/non-pending
rule at the date of the filing of the federal case would "trivialize" Younger.
But it could have that effect only if the primary basis for Younger is the state
interest in reviewing federal claims, for in that event the state's interest would
70
be the same regardless of the fortuity of who won the race to the courthouse.
By contrast, strict adherence to a pending/non-pending rule fully serves the
policies of avoiding disruption and insult relied on in Stefel. On the facts of
Hicks, the Steffel argument, which is based on respect for other courts' proceedings, would suggest that the state court and not the federal court should
7t
exercise self-restraint.
The tensions between Huffman and Moore on the one hand, and Steffel
on the other, are more subtle. In Huffman the Court held that the individual
not only must raise federal claims at the state trial level but must also pursue
state appellate remedies as well. The argument that federal relief disrupts the
state's system of justice carries less weight in the appellate context.72 When
the individual foregoes appeal in favor of a federal suit, there is no interference with any state court proceeding. The state interest implicated here is not
disruption of state proceedings but the broad state interest in hearing federal
challenges to state law. This interest may be stronger on appeal than at trial,
for one of its premises is that state courts should have an opportunity to construe state law to fit constitutional standards. Appellate courts have broader
73
authority and can perform that function more effectively than trial courts.
Thus, Huffman can be justified on the broad state interest in state review of
66. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
67. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
68. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).

69. 422 U.S. at 349-50.
70. See Fiss, supra note 4, at 1109, 1135.

71. See 422 U.S. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Younger v. Harris and its companion cases
reflect the principle that the federal judiciary must refrain from interfering with the legitimate
functioning of state courts. But surely the converse is a principle no less valid.").
72. See Fiss, supra note 4, at 1139-40. But see 420 U.S. at 608.
73. See 420 U.S. at 609. See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426-27 & n.10 (1979).
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federal claims, but not on the narrow interest in avoiding disruption of pending state proceedings.
Moore concerned pending trial proceedings, but it undermines Steffel's
rationale in another way. The case arose after state officials, in response to
complaints of child abuse, took away Sims' children and commenced state
court proceedings to determine their future custody. Sims and his wife Shen
brought a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of the original seizure
and detention of his children without a prompt hearing at which its grounds
could be challenged. The claim was offensive rather than defensive. Framing
the issue as "whether [Sims'] constitutional claims could have been raised in
the pending state proceedings," the Court examined state law, found that they
could have been raised in a permissive counterclaim,7 4 and barred the federal
suit. It was irrelevant, the Court said, that the federal claims were not cogniza75
ble as defenses in the original state custody suit.
Steffel's disruption and insult arguments, however, rest on the premise
that disrespect is a danger and that deference is appropriate when a federal
issue may be raised as a defense to state law in a state enforcement action, and
not whenever there happens to be a state proceeding at which federal claims
can be raised. Only in the former circumstances would it be unseemly for the
federal court to take an issue away from the state court. 76 Accordingly, even
though there was a pending proceeding in Moore, the Court could not rely on
Steffel's insult and disruption arguments. Instead, it grounded its decision on
the broad state interest in hearing federal challenges to state law.7 7 The dissent noted the departure from the customary rule with respect to plaintiffs
asserting claims offensively: "If there is no requirement that federal plaintiffs
initiate constitutional litigation in state rather than federal court in the first
instance-and this Court has repeatedly held that there is not-then the coincidence of an unrelated state proceeding provides no justification for imposing
'78
such a requirement.
Hicks, Huffman, and Moore undermine the Steffel Court's distinction between the Moore and Younger plaintiff. These cases all suggest that it is not
the presence of a state proceeding that justifies federal court deference, but
rather the state interest in state review of any constitutional challenge to state
law. That state interest is broad enough to cover both types of federal plaintiffs. If it is strong enough to support restraint in the one situation, it should
have the same implication in the other. Indeed, in Moore the federal plaintiff
was like the plaintiff in Monroe in that he was required to raise his federal
claim in state court not because it was a defense to the state proceeding against
him, but merely because there happened to be a state proceeding where it
74. 442 U.S. at 425-26 n.9.

75. Id. at 430 n.12.
76. See id. at 436-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 29, at 1317-19.

77. See 442 U.S. at 429-30. The Court also thought that the policies in favor of state courts
deciding state law issues and against hearing issues that are not ripe favored federal dismissal. See
id. at 427-29.
78. Id. at 440 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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could be brought. These cases show that the Court has now abandoned the
narrow comity argument of Steffel. But it has neither replaced Steffel with
some other rationale for its division of cases between federal and state courts
nor applied the reasoning of the later cases to the ordinary Monroe-type plaintiff. So extended, that reasoning would require the overruling of Monroe.
Will the rejection of Monroe be the next step in the Court's development
of judicial federalism? One reading of the cases gives an affirmative answer to
that question. Professor Fiss, writing in 1977, examined Huffman and Hicks
and concluded that Monroe "may soon be but a formal vestige of another
era."7 9 Fiss and other critics80 argue that the reasoning of cases like Huffman
and Hicks signal a rejection of the individual interest in a federal forum in
favor of the state interest in a state forum as the general guideline for resolving
allocation issues. Moore, decided in 1979, certainly supports that view of the
Court's actions, and perhaps the Court of the 1980's will prove its critics right.
There is, however, significant evidence that the Court is not moving toward a general contraction of federal adjudication of constitutional challenges
on all fronts. Several important and somewhat surprising decisions of the past
few years have broadened access to federal court for such claims. In 1978
Monell v. Department of SocialServices8 l held for the first time that municipalities are "persons" within the language of section 1983 and therefore may
be sued in federal court. It is noteworthy that this ruling is one the Court
could easily have avoided. Monroe v. Pape itself had said that the term "persons", as used in the statute, did not include cities. 82 To reach its expansive
result in Monell, the Court had to expressly overrule this aspect of Monroe.
Two 1980 cases further increased the individual's access to federal court and
the chances of success once there. Owen v. City of Independence83 held that
the good faith defense provided to individual defendants in section 1983 suits
is not available to municipalities. Maine v. Thiboutot8 4 held that individuals
may bring section 1983 suits to redress not only constitutional violations but
also a wide variety of statutory violations.
While these developments in section 1983 law do not bear directly on the
allocation issue, they do substantially augment the federal remedies available
to individuals with claims against state and local governments. They are cast
as constructions of the statute, but it is a statute that leaves plenty of room for
judicial creativity. Were the Court truly bent on generally constricting access
to federal court for individuals with complaints against state and local governments, it surely would have avoided these expansive rulings. Monell, Owen,
and Thiboutot call into question the "general narrowing of federal remedies"
79. Fiss, supra note 4, at 1142.
80. E.g., Neuborne, supra note 4, at 1118 n.48; Soifer & Macgill, supra note 27, at 1142-43;
Weinberg, supra note 4, at 1205; Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable
Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 Duke Li. 523, 570-71.

81. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
82. 365 U.S. at 187-92.
83. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
84. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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interpretation of Hicks, Huffman, and Moore. Just as important, they once
again highlight the question of how to account for these recent developments
in the Younger doctrine.
Both the Court's and the critics' explanations for the Younger line of cases
are inadequate. The Court's Steffel rationale does not account for Hicks,
Huffman, and Moore. The critics' forebodings about the demise of access to
federal court is belied by the other recent developments in section 1983 law.
An alternative explanation of the cases, and in my view the most nearly accurate, is that the Court's pending/non-pending distinction draws a pragmatic
and unprincipled line between classes of federal cases in an effort to make a
rough political compromise between the values of state autonomy and individual access to federal court. The Court is unwilling to choose between a general requirement that individuals first take their claims to state court and a
general rule that they need never do so. Nor has it managed to develop more
specific standards by identifying one or the other interest as the more important in particular circumstances.8 5 The division between Monroe plaintiffs
and Younger plaintiffs that is enforced by the pending/non-pending distinction makes no sense in terms of the broad state interest in review of federal
challenges to state policies. It is, however, a practical compromise that permits
86
both state and individual interests to prevail some of the time.
If this reading of the cases is correct, then comity does not stand for any
principle but is a slogan used to obscure the absence of good reasons for treating the cases differently. In Steffel the Court says that comity is important in
Younger cases because the state interest in the integrity of state proceedings is
a strong one. In Hicks, Huffman, and Moore, the Court continues to rely on
Younger and comity in explaining its results, but the referent of comity seems
to change. It no longer signifies respect for state court proceedings but rather
respect for state court review of federal challenges to state law. The Court
never confronts Steffel directly, however, and the result is two lines of cases
that seem inconsistent with each other. One treats comity as a narrow interest
in state proceedings while the other treats it as a broad interest in state adjudication. With the justifications for federal restraint left uncertain, the federal
85. It might, for example, have adopted a principle that, on account of their fragility or importance, first amendment claims should be heard in federal court. See Thorns v. Heffernan, 473
F.2d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414
F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969); Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of
a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 486-87 & n.l17 (1978); Shapo, supra note 57, at 329. In
another vein, it might have made a rule that, because federal interference with the internal
processes of state courts is especially likely to create friction, federal deference is especially favored in connection with such matters as bail determinations. See, e.g., Finetti v. Hams, 609 F.2d
594, 600 (2d Cir. 1979); Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
912 (1976); Brown v. Fogel, 395 F.2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1968). Such deference might also be
appropriate for cases involving attorney discipline. See, e.g., Gipson v. New Jersey Supreme
Court, 558 F.2d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038 (1975), Silvers v. Dowling, 495 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1974).
86. Compare the rule that federal jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law must be
determined from the face of the complaint, Louisville & Nashville R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908), a rule that draws a similarly arbitrary line for pragmatic reasons. See Cohen, The Broken
Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev.
890, 893-94 (1967).
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courts can defend the arbitrary pending/non-pending distinction against attacks from either side. Arguments against it on the side of the state can be met
by citing Steffel, ignoring the later cases that conflict with Steffel, and adding
some rhetoric on the strong individual interest in a federal forum for federal
claims. 87 Arguments against it on behalf of the individual, in cases where the
Stel policies are weak or absent, can be met by citing Hicks or Huffman and
adverting to the strong state interest in a state forum. 8 8
B. Burford4bstention
Younger and Monroe, taken together, produce the general rule that in the
absence of a pending state proceeding, individuals may bring federal claims
against state officers in federal court. Under Bujford, federal courts are required to defer to state courts on constitutional questions even when there is
no pending state proceeding, on the ground that the subject matter of the lawsuit is one peculiarly suited to state court adjudication.8 9 Courts often state
that in such circumstances comity requires federal deference. These cases typically, but not always, concern challenges to the actions of state administrative
agencies, such as the granting of a permit to drill for oil or the refusal of a
common carrier's request to terminate service to a small town.
Why are these cases accorded special treatment? From time to time the
Court has given two explanations, neither of which withstands scrutiny. One
approach is to characterize the subject matter of the lawsuit as peculiarly local,
and offer this characterization, coupled with a reference to comity, as justification for dismissal. The unarticulated premise underlying cases adopting this
approach appears to be that the state interest in state adjudication of these
local matters is different from and stronger than the state interest in other cases
and is sufficient to warrant allocation of final decision-making to the state
court. This argument rests on an elusive distinction between the peculiarly
local and the not peculiarly local that is an unsound basis on which to decide
these issues.
Consider4abamaPublicService Commission v. Southern Railway.90 The
railroad sought to discontinue service to a small town but was turned down by
the Commission. The railroad then sought to challenge the Commission's action in federal court on the ground that its property had been taken without
due process of law because it was forced to maintain an unprofitable route.
The Court held that the district court should have dismissed, relying in part on
its characterization of the problem of balancing the loss to the railroad against
87. See, e.g., Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 527
(1980); Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219, 231-34 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609
F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).

88. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Peoples' Baptist Church, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 481 F. Supp. 1101, 1107-09 (S.D. Tex. 1979), afld, 621 F.2d 438 (1980).
89. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); see generally Scope of Burford Doctrine, supra note 25.
90. 341 U.S. 341 (1951). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228, 233 (Ist Cir.
1979); Simmons v. Jones, 478 F.2d 321, 328 & cases cited at 327-28 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973), modified,
519 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the harm caused by the loss of service as "essentially local." 9 1 The Court did
not explain why this problem was more local than any other activity regulated
by state law with an overlay of federal constitutional law. Nor was an explanation forthcoming when, without adverting to Alabama PSC, the Court in
McNeese v. Boardof Education92 held that the Bulord doctrine did not apply
to a school desegregation case concerning an administrative agency because
there was "no underlying issue of state law controlling [the] litigation. The
right alleged [was] as plainly federal in origin and nature as those vindicated
in Brown v. Board of Education ... .- 93 However, the same was true of the
right asserted in Alabama PSC.
The Ninth Circuit, in InternationalBrotherhoodof ElectricalWorkers Local 1245 v. Public Service Commission,94 recently made a similar point in
denying Bulford abstention in a case in which the plaintiff claimed federal
preemption of state law:
A preemption claim alleges in essence that Congress has determined that particular matters are of national concern and should be
administered by national, rather than local, institutions. If a preemption claim is well-founded, therefore, Burford abstention cannot be
appropriate. Hence, a court cannot abstain under Buford in a preemption case without implicitly ruling on the merits of the action. 95
In short, the presence of a federal issue negates characterization of a problem as peculiarly local, for it necessarily indicates a federal interest in resolution of the dispute.
Some cases offer a more sophisticated explanation of Burford abstention
than the local interest label. Thus, the Supreme Court recently characterized
Butford as expressing a policy against disruption of state programs. 96 If federal adjudication would unnecessarily disrupt state policies, particularly if
state policies are carried out through an intricate administrative scheme with
judicial review confined to a particular court, the federal court should dismiss.
An example of this approach is a recent First Circuit case, Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Sabbagh 97 An automobile insurer brought a federal challenge to insurance rates set by the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner, arguing that the
rates were confiscatory in violation of the federal and Massachusetts constitutions. Stressing the state's designation of a single court to review the determinations of the Commissioner, the extraordinary powers of that state court, and
the expertise it would necessarily acquire in examining insurance rate issues,
the court held that federal review would disrupt this scheme and dismissal was
91. 341 U.S. at 347.

92. 373 U.S. 668 (1973).
93. Id. at 674. See Scope of Bu.ford Doctrine, supra note 25, at 978-79. It is noteworthy that

when it suits the Court's purposes, the Court is capable of characterizing education as a peculiarly
local matter. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-83 (1977); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodiguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973).
94. 614 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1980).

95. Id. at 212 n.l. See also Hart & Wechsler, supra note 14, at 996.
96. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1976).
97. 603 F.2d 228 (1st Cir. 1979).
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appropriate. 98
Closer examination calls this disruption argument into question. If a federal decision is to have an unnecessarily disruptive impact on a state program,
the federal decision must be wrong, otherwise the disruption is warranted. As
the Sabbagh court acknowledged, "[tlhe state has no right to an unconstitutional policy. . ...99 Thus, federal restraint would be warranted only if the
federal court were more likely to err than the state court. While the federal
court might be more likely to err on state issues, one premise behind Article HI
and the federal jurisdictional statutes is that the federal courts are as good as,
if not better than, state courts at deciding federal issues. Therefore, an argument can be made for abstention on state but not federal issues. If the purpose
of abstention is to avoid incorrect decisions of state law, then Pullman abstention, which allocates unsettled state law issues to state courts but takes account
of the plaintiffs interest in a federal forum by retaining control of federal issues, is the appropriate federal response. 1°
A third explanation of the Court's Bulford cases, although unarticulated
in the opinions, is more plausible. The Bu ford doctrine is generally invoked
in business regulation cases.10 1 The Court allocates these cases to state courts
while assigning other constitutional cases to federal courts, even though the
issues in a Burford case may be analytically identical to those in a race discrimination or employee firing case. Perhaps the Court's special treatment of
business cases can best be understood as a pragmatic compromise like the
pending/non-pending distinction in the Younger doctrine, a distinction between business cases and other constitutional cases that makes practical sense,
but cannot be justified in terms of principle. The Court's unarticulated argument on behalf of this distinction may be that few of the constitutional challenges presented in these cases are likely to be successful in any court, given
the relaxed attitude toward business regulation in modem due process and
equal protection law. 10 2 Most of the important issues in the cases, therefore,
will be governed by state law and are best left to state courts. 103
Again, these pragmatic judgments are made possible by the Court's fail98. See id. at 233-34.
99. Id. at 232.
100. See, e.g., IBEW Local 1245 v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 F.2d 206, 212 (9th Cir. 1980).
The Sabbagh court obliquely takes issue with the argument in the text. It asserts that the state
court "with its special powers and expertise, could protect [the federal plaintiff's] federal rights as
well as, if not better than, a federal court could." 603 F.2d at 233-34. But see Scope of Burford
Doctrine, supra note 25, at 994-96 ("The potential for state court bias in'Bu ord abstention is
substantial in comparison with other forms of abstention.").
101. Bezanson, supra note 27, at 1125.
102. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963).
103. This reasoning suggests a corollary: When a federal claim concerning business regulation
is not based on the fourteenth amendment, the generalization that it is likely a weak one does not
hold true and Buford abstention may not be appropriate. For example, in IBEW Local 1245 v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1980), the federal claim was that a federal statute
preempted state law and the court rejected B uford abstention. Under the analysis suggested in
the text this result would remain good even if the case cannot be distinguished from other Bur'ord
cases under the "peculiarly local" or "disruption" tests the courts purport to use.
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ure to identify its "principles of comity" with enough precision to permit confident criticism. When the Court adverts to comity, it sometimes associates the
term with its local interest argument and sometimes with its disruption argument. But it never fully develops either one, leaving its critics to box at
shadows.
C Exhaustion of State Remedies: The DistinctionBetween Habeas and
Section 1983
The great majority of constitutional challenges are brought to federal
court under either the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or the Habeas
Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. There are several significant differences between these federal remedies. First, federal habeas corpus is available only for
state prisoners who claim they are held in custody in violation of their constitutional rights. 1°4 Section 1983 is available to anyone with a constitutional
10 6
claim against a state officer, 10 5 except those who may petition for habeas.
Second, the Court, in contravention of the traditional principles of collateral
estoppel, has construed the habeas statute to permit relitigation of issues already decided in the state criminal proceeding that led to the petitioner's incarceration. 10 7 It has held that relitigation is precluded in section 1983 suits,
explaining that the individual's special interest in freedom from unjust confinement accounts for the habeas exception and that this interest is not present
in the section 1983 context. 108
Comity is not a significant factor in either of these differences between the
two remedies, 10 9 but it does bear on a third difference between them. The
habeas petitioner must exhaust his state judicial and administrative remedies
before taking his claim to federal court,110 but a section 1983 plaintiff may
bring his case in federal court without first pursuing state remedies."' The
exhaustion requirement on habeas is now included in the habeas statute, but it
began in 1886 in Exparte Royall 1 2 as a rule imposed by the Supreme Court
based on comity. Today, courts still treat it as a flexible judge-made principle
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1948). The Court extends a rather broad construction to the term
"custody." See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (petitioner in "custody"
even when he is released on his own recognizance awaiting sentence); Jones v. Cunningham, 371

U.S. 236 (1963) (petitioner in "custody" when he is released on parole).
105. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
106. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
107. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,422-23 (1963). See also Allen v. McCurry, 101
411, 417 n.12 (1980).
108. Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. at 417, n.12, 420 (1980).

S. Ct.

109. In the section 1983 collateral estoppel case the Court adverts to comity as one of several
policies supporting claim preclusion. Id. at 415. But the Court's reasoning in support of its con-

clusion that claim preclusion applies to section 1983 suits does not rely on comity. It stresses the
differences between habeas and section 1983 and the Court's interpretation of the legislative history of section 1983. See id. at 416-20.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2254b(c) (1948). See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
111. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183
(1961).
112. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
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rather than a rigid statutory requirement. 1 3 Courts explain why comity requires exhaustion with arguments similar to those employed in Younger
cases.1 14 Exhaustion avoids disruption of the state criminal process and gives
state courts an opportunity to apply constitutional standards to the construction and application of state law and the conduct of state officers. 115 These
state interests are generally strong enough to overcome the individual's interest in immediate access to federal court.
This explanation of exhaustion is inadequate to distinguish habeas from
section 1983. The first part of the argument-that exhaustion avoids disruption of the state criminal process-does not account for the requirement that
the habeas petitioner exhaust state appellate remedies. No state proceeding is
disrupted if after his criminal conviction a prisoner chooses to abandon any
further entreaties to the state courts.
The second part of the argument-that exhaustion gives state courts an
opportunity to apply constitutional standards to the administration of state
law-is a plausible reason for requiring exhaustion. The problem with it is
that it seems equally applicable to section 1983 cases. For example, an individual might claim that the police tortured him in order to extract a confession. If he is tried for the crime, he cannot obtain federal habeas until the state
trial and appellate process has run its course. If the same individual is not
tried for the crime, he may bring a damage action under section 1983 without
ever presenting his claim to the state courts. Yet the conduct of the state officer is the same in both cases. If comity requires deference to the state interest
in review of the actions of state officers in the first case, why not in the second
as well?
One answer might be that the first case differs from the second because
the decision of a state judge is at issue in the one but not the other, and it is
especially important that higher state courts be given the opportunity to oversee the actions of state judges. Perhaps it would be especially disrespectful for
a federal court to review the actions of a state judge before other state judges
have done so. This argument, stressing a distinction between the acts of state
judges and those of other state officers, fails because the habeas exhaustion
requirement is not limited to state review of judicial acts. A state prisoner
awaiting trial, who seeks federal review of the statute under which he is
charged, is precluded by the exhaustion rule even though he does not seek
review of the act of a state judge.1 6 Also, where the state remedy available to
rather than judicial, he must still
a prisoner seeking release is administrative
17
exhaust it before petitioning for habeas."
113. See note 17 supra.
114. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1976).
115. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 275-78 (1971).
116. See, e.g., Hillegas v. Sams, 349 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966).
See also Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980);
United States ex rel Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1976).
117. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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The Court gives a different answer for the variant treatment of habeas
and section 1983 cases stating that the distinction is a simple matter of congressional prerogative. The habeas statute requires exhaustion and section
1983 does not. 118 This answer is inadequate because it misstates the present
law on habeas exhaustion and ignores the history of the statutory requirement.
As noted earlier, the requirement did not originate in the statute but in the
Court's opinion in Ex parte Royall, where the Court justified it on comity
grounds.1 19 When Congress codified exhaustion, it merely adopted the
Court's rule. Even today, the requirement remains in part solely a judicial
one. Congress did not codify pre-trial exhaustion, 120 yet the Court still requires it.
Judge Friendly offers yet a third explanation for the Court's distinction.
Noting that collateral estoppel applies in section 1983 suits but not in habeas,
he points out that an exhaustion of judicial remedies requirement in section
1983 cases would effectively bar the plaintiff from a federal forum altogether, a
result the Court does not wish to reach. 12 1 Judge Friendly goes on to argue,
and lower courts have occasionally agreed, 122 that exhaustion of state administrative remedies ought to be required in section 1983 cases because administrative decisions do not have collateral estoppel effect.
This argument like the other two does not satisfactorily distinguish between habeas and section 1983 cases. Judge Friendly does not dispute that the
considerations favoring exhaustion are present in section 1983 cases. Indeed,
those considerations are the basis for his recommendation that administrative
exhaustion be required. His argument, restated as an analysis of the competing interests, is that the individual's interest in a federal forum should prevail
in cases where recognizing the state interest in exhaustion would have the effect of precluding rather than merely delaying access to a federal forum. This
distinction between delay and preclusion of a federal forum is superficially
attractive but runs into difficulties on closer examination.
The argument suggests that the state's interest in exhaustion is strong
enough to warrant delay but not preclusion of access to a federal forum. This
much is unobjectionable. But then it leaps to the conclusion that this difference between preclusion and delay can distinguish habeas from section 1983.
It skips over the fact that the state's interest in preclusion is based not on the
exhaustion policies that would put the case in state court, but on the quite
different policies of economy and repose that underlie the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Court held in Allen v. McCurry 123 that these policies are
strong enough to warrant preclusion in section 1983 cases. If habeas and sec118. See id. at 492-93 n.10 (1973).

119. See note 17 supra.
120. See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 890-91.
121. See H. Friendly, supra note 14, at 100-03.
122. See, e.g., Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981); Secret v. Brierton, 584
F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978). It is not clear whether Judge Friendly would approve these decisions, as

he casts his proposal in the form of a recommendation to Congress.
123. 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980).
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tion 1983 cannot be distinguished in terms of the exhaustion policy, as Judge
Friendly's argument concedes, and if collateral estoppel policies outweigh the
interest in a federal forum and require preclusion once the case is decided in
state court, as Allen holds, then it follows that the exhaustion and preclusion
policies taken together are strong enough to wholly deny access to a federal
forum. The logic of exhaustion and preclusion once again threaten the survival of Monroe v. Pape.
Yet the Court is content to retain both Monroe and the exhaustion and
preclusion principles that challenge it. In my view the Court's serenity in the
face of these conflicting principles can be explained only by abandoning the
search for viable distinctions between habeas and section 1983. Instead, the
Court's decisions once again should be viewed as pragmatic compromises.
Just as preclusion of federal review in Younger cases serves the state interest in
state adjudication, so does the absence of an exhaustion requirement in section
1983 cases help accommodate the individual interest in a federal forum. The
habeas exhaustion requirement coupled with a special exemption from collateral estoppel tries to accommodate state and individual interests at the same
time, granting access, but not immediate access, and permitting state review,
but not the final say. While the lines between the three groups of federal challenges are largely arbitrary, those lines do serve the Court's goal of accommodating both the state and individual interests.
The habeas/section 1983 distinction on exhaustion once again belies the
Court's claim that it rests its decisions on principles of comity. In the habeas
exhaustion cases, comity seems to refer to a strong state interest in the supervision of state officers. It figures prominently in the Court's explanation of its
rules. But when the focus shifts to section 1983 cases, these concerns are suddenly ignored, even though the state interest in exhausting section 1983 claims
seems similar to its interests in habeas exhaustion. Comity is best characterized not as a principle that provides good reasons for the distinctions it draws,
but as a rhetorical tool to be introduced into an opinion when the case falls on
the deference side of the Court's arbitrary line and ignored in cases that fall on
the federal access side of that line.
D. ProceduralDefault
The Court relies on comity as the basis for its doctrine of procedural default in habeas corpus cases.1 24 Here, comity is not a talismanic word that the
Court invokes to reach a result it cannot justify with good reasons, nor a term
whose meaning shifts from one case to the next, nor a rhetorical tool employed
when it is useful and ignored when it is not. In this area the Court has articulated a principle that the state's strong interest in the integrity of its procedural
rules requires federal courts to refuse to hear certain claims raised on habeas.
124. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83-84 (1977). See also Hill, The Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1050, 1056-59 (1978). Professor Hill
argues, with no apparent support from any member of the current Court, that the Court errs in

resting its procedural default doctrine upon comity instead of the habeas statute.
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Procedural default arises when the state criminal defendant fails to assert
a federal constitutional claim in accordance with a valid state procedural rule.
Wainwright v. Sykes 125 is illustrative. At Sykes's murder trial the prosecutor
placed in evidence a damaging statement Sykes had made to the police.
Sykes's lawyer made no objection, but later Sykes sought to raise a Miranda
claim on habeas. A state rule required contemporaneous objection to the introduction of evidence to avoid waiving the objection. Mindful of the state
interest in enforcing its procedural rules, the Court held in Sykes that the Miranda claim could not be raised on habeas absent a showing of cause for not
126
objecting at trial and a showing of resulting prejudice to defendant's case.
The Court's justification for its procedural default rules is that the state's
interest in the integrity of procedural rules is very strong and the individual
interest against them is generally weak. A rule like the contemporaneous objection rule at issue in Sykes enables errors to be corrected at an early date
while the evidence is still fresh and substantial resources have not been invested in a tainted proceeding. In addition, it helps assure the perception of
the trial "as a decisive and portentous event" where the defendant should face
the charges against him and raise all available defenses. 127 Other procedural
rules serve similar goals. 128
The individual, in the Court's view, has few good excuses for not complying with a valid procedural rule. His lawyer may prefer not to present a claim
to the state courts because he wishes to avoid delay in getting before a federal
court or to avoid the possibility that the federal habeas court will defer to a
state court factual determination. But these reasons are not sufficient to over29
come the state's interest in enforcing its procedural rules.'
The Court's procedural default doctrine is open to several criticisms. The
Court announced its "cause" and "prejudice" standard in Sykes without explaning precisely what the terms mean. 130 It promised to explicate them in
later cases but has not yet fulfilled its promise. The Court may fairly be
faulted for failing to define these terms adequately. One might also disagree
with the Court's weighing of state and individual interests. While the content
of "cause" is unclear, Sykes seems to hold that the individual is barred by his
lawyer's incompetence from litigating constitutional issues on habeas.13 ' The
effect of the rule is to deny the individual any opportunity to raise constitutional claims. It has been forcefully argued that such a rule purchases the
integrity of procedural rules at too great a price to the individual's interest in a
federal forum and that punishing the individual for his lawyer's lack of acu125. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1979).
126. 433 U.S. at 87. See generally Hill, supra note 124, at 1050.
127. See 433 U.S. at 88-90.
128. See, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
129. See 433 U.S. at 88-91.
130. See id. at 90-91.
131. See id. at 101-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Harris v. Spears, 606 F.2d 639, 644
(5th Cir. 1979).
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132
men will do little to enforce compliance with procedural rules.
For present purposes, however, the important question is not whether the
Court's choice of values is the wisest or whether its rule could be more fully
explained. The relevant question is whether the Court has articulated a principle of comity or drawn an arbitrary line between cases that are not significantly different. Justice Brennan argues that the Court has drawn an arbitrary
line. He notes that comity ordinarily supports delay of federal adjudication in
habeas cases by the requirement that state remedies be exhausted. Here, however, the Court invokes comity to preclude federal review altogether. If comity is only strong enough to delay federal access in the exhaustion area, it
33
should have no greater impact in the procedural default context.
This argument fails because it incorrectly assumes that the state's interest
in a procedural default rule is the same as its interest in an exhaustion rule. In
fact, the two areas are quite different. Exhaustion protects the state interest in
reviewing the actions of state officers. That interest can be adequately served
without precluding later federal review. Procedural default is based on the
state interest in effectively enforcing its procedural rules, and a major purpose
of these rules is to assure that the case is disposed of at one trial. Only by
precluding federal review can this aim be achieved. In Sykes, for example, the
alternatives to preclusion would be to permit a litigant who had violated a
contemporaneous objection rule to raise his claim for the first time in federal
court or to raise it in a retrial in the state courts. But the objective of the rule is
to avoid more than one trial, and either of these approaches would wholly
undermine that purpose.
How has the Court succeeded in devising a principle of comity in the
procedural default cases when it has failed in other federal law areas? The
reason may be that procedural default features a state interest, the integrity of
procedural rules, that is both strong (at least in the Court's view) and limited
to a narrow range of cases. Because procedural default is a narrower problem
in which the state and individual interests are different from other areas, it is
possible here to fashion a principle whose internal logic and natural boundaries do not expand to cover the whole field of constitutional challenges.

IV.

SUBSTANTIVE COMITY

The cases discussed in Part III allocate adjudication between state and
federal courts, but they do not provide much support for the critics' argument
that the Court is trying to abolish individual access to federal court. The
Court's aim in those cases is to serve both state and individual interests by
permitting individual access in some kinds of cases and denying it in others.
Perhaps the Court can be faulted for drawing arbitrary lines between groups
of cases that are alike in all significant respects, but it cannot be faulted for
using comity to undermine all access to federal courts.
132. See 433 U.S. at 99-118 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 551 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The critics' argument finds more support in another class of cases where
the Court invokes comity not to delay federal adjudication or to allocate cases
to state courts but to deny substantive rights. The most infamous example is
Rizzo v. Goode.134 There the plaintiffs complained of various police practices
in Philadelphia. The district court granted an injunction ordering the mayor
and officials of the police department to take certain remedial steps. The
Supreme Court reversed, relying on, among other reasons, "principles of federalism ' 135 developed under the rubric of comity in the Younger line of cases.
The Court, through Mr. Justice Rehnquist, said that those principles restrain federal courts not only from enjoining judicial proceedings but also
from interfering with state executive officers:
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part
in governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments, though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their
greatest weight in cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal
prosecution in progress, have not been limited either to that situation
or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We think these principles
likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought, not
against the judicial branch of the state government, but against those
in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local government such as petitioners here. 136
In addition, it seems to make no difference whether the plaintiffs' claim could
be raised in state court. The Court does not indicate that an adequate state
remedy is a condition of federal court deference. Federalist values here do not
postpone federal review, nor do they allocate decisions to state courts. Instead,
holding that federalism requires deference to the mayor and police officials is
a roundabout way of holding that individuals have no federal rights that protect them from the mayor's and police officials' conduct. 137
Comity and federalism are not used in this way very often.13 8 Rizzo itself
may be explained on other grounds, such as a ruling that the causal connection
between the official's conduct and the plaintiffs' harm was too tenuous to war134. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
135. Id. at 379.

136. Id. at 380.
137. See Fiss, supra note 4, 1159-60; Comment, supra note 4,at 1220-21; Comment, supra note

80, at 570-71. See also Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (1978).
138. Rizzo has sometimes been used to limit substantive rights. See, e.g., Carmona v. Ward,
576 F.2d 405, 414 (2d Cir. 1978) (comity bars federal review of state parole decisions), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1091 (1979); Abbot v. Thetford, 534 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (adopting Judge Gewin's
originally dissenting opinion, reported at 529 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1976)) (comity forbids federal
review ofstate judge's dismissal of probation officer on his staff), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
Other examples of substantive comity may be found in Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d 150,
158 (3d Cir.) (rejecting argument that comity bars contempt decree against state officers who violate federal court order), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d
1154, 1157 n.2 (5th Cir.) (reserving the question whether comity requires deference to secondary
school officials on haircut regulations), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (D.NJ. 1979) (comity bars liability for simple negligence but not for
gross negligence in committing constitutional tort).
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rant injunctive relief.' 39 Yet, the substantive comity reading of the case has
historical anal6gues. Before the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments were incorporated into the fourteenth, courts sometimes adverted to comity as the
reason why states were held to lower standards than the federal government
with respect to constitutional guarantees in criminal procedure.' 40 Before
Procunier v. Martinez' 4' and similar cases held to the contrary, courts used
comity to justify refusal to interfere in the conduct of state prisons) 42 These
illustrations show that comity is a "spacious concept; it can serve whatever
143
Advocates of substantive comity value the state
values are infused into it.'
interest in autonomy so much that they would deny the individual not only a
federal forum but any federal right at all.
If the Court valued this state interest highly enough, it could dismantle as
much as it pleased of the fourteenth amendment law developed in the past
thirty years. It bears emphasis, however, that most of the case law rejects such
a lofty valuation of the state interest in freedom from federal interference.
With the possible exception of Justices Burger' 44 and Rehnquist, no member
of the present Court seems interested in using comity as a vehicle for undermining substantive rights. Accordingly, it seems precipitous to draw the inference thatRizzo is a harbinger of such a development.' 4 5 More likely, Rizzo is
just an awkward case. The Court was uncomfortable with an injunction that
ordered affirmative remedial steps on the part of officials who had not been
adequately linked to the unconstitutional conduct. Its broad references to
comity and federalism helped bolster its reversal of the injunction, but they
were too vague to indicate any commitment on the part of the Court to the
general proposition that values of federalism can place limits on substantive
constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION

Comity sometimes stands for a principle, such as "state law in state
courts" or deterrence of procedural default. Occasionally, as in .Rizzo,the
Court may use comity to restrict substantive constitutional protections. More
often, comity is the Court's tool for avoiding a choice between two competing
values: state court adjudication of constitutional challenges to state law and
individual access to federal court for constitutional claims. By choosing one of
139. See 423 U.S. at 372-77; Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
931 (1977). See also Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978); Cox,
supra note 137, at 16; Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts (forthcoming).
140. See, e.g., Scoleri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720, 736 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828
(1963). See also Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125, 127 (8th Cir.) (rejecting the state's argument), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
141. 416 U.S. 396, 400, 404-05 (1974).
142. See, e.g., Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966) (per curiam). See generally
Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
143. Fiss, supra note 4, at 1124.
144. On the Chief Justice, see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 427 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
145. One distinguished commentator does take that view of the case, however. See Fiss, supra
note 4, at 1159-60.
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the two values as its guiding premise, the Court could create a consistent body
of principles for deciding allocation issues. But because the Court wishes to
promote both of them, it has instead made a pragmatic compromise. It assigns
some constitutional challenges to state court under Younger and Buford,
some to federal court under Monroe, and some to both through the habeas
exhaustion rules.
The problem with the Court's solution is that there are often no significant differences among the cases it assigns to each of these three categories. As
a result, the Court faces a hard tactical problem when it is asked to explain the
distinctions it draws. It is unwilling to admit outright that its distinctions are
arbitrary. Instead, it pretends that they are sound, explaining that they are
supported by principles of comity. But attempts to identify good reasons behind the invocation of comity end in frustration, for the Court changes the
content of the term in moving from one case to another. Critics of federal1 46
state comity say that comity is not a helpful concept because it is "vague,"'
148
14 7
These charges overlook the subtlety of
and "uncertain."'
"talismanic,"'
the Court's approach to the allocation problem, and they are not without
irony. The shapelessness of comity is precisely what makes it useful to the
Court.

dissenting). See also New
146. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 346 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 767 n.9 (3d Cir.) ("less than clear cut"), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 894 (1978); Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal
Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 841, 867 (1972) ("undefined").
147. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 551 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Viekers v. Trainor, 546 F.2d 739, 746 (7th Cir. 1976).
148. Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973) (Hays, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974). See also Fiss, supra note 4, at 1124 ("a spacious concept ... [that]
can serve whatever values are infused into it").

